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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

AIR

100-A-13031

SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, EE

9 April 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

Operational

Progress Report - CAUTERY 10

1. No requests for action are contained in this letter. From our files, it appears that the last specific information you have on the activity of CAUTERY 10 dates from 18 October 1951, KGB-A-10372. This will serve to bring you up to date.

2. A CAUTERY report dated 27 December 1951 notes that sometime in either November or December of that year, CAUTERY 10 made the acquaintance of a Russian captain named Petrovich ANATOLII, who was reported at that time as living in Johann-Georgenstadt, Bahnhofstrasse 4. At that time nothing more was known of his official activity, but it appears that he paid considerable attention to CAUTERY 10, and requested another meeting.

3. A CAUTERY report of 17 January 1952 states that CAUTERY 10 had agreed to accept ANATOLII's suggestion (made at some undetermined time) to visit him at a hotel in Auersberg (in the vicinity of Johann-Georgenstadt) to go skiing. He had given her a Poste Restante address (Johann-Georgenstadt, Bahnhofstrasse 45) to which she could write accepting his invitation, and her letter (translated by one of our agents into Russian) set a date for 10 February 1952. The letter also requested ANATOLII to write to a friend of CAUTERY 10's in Johann-Georgenstadt to acknowledge receipt of her letter.

4. CAUTERY 10 arrived at the Sporthotel in Johann-Georgenstadt on 10 February, as she had written, but was not met by ANATOLII, nor had he left word as to his intentions. However, shortly after her arrival, a letter for her came to her friends in Johann-Georgenstadt, asking her to write to a Poste Restante address. (Photostats of this letter are being prepared). She states that she answered as requested, stating that she could stay only a few more days. The answer of CAUTERY 10 was not picked up for two days, according to her report, but on the third day a Russian soldier left a large bouquet for her with her friend. (Note: ANATOLII knew that she could be reached through this address).

5. CAUTERY 10 had previously made the acquaintance of a driver who knew ANATOLII, and now learned from him that ANATOLII was going to Chemnitz on 21 February. She therefore wrote him that she must leave on the train for Chemnitz at 1500, hoping that he would find some way to meet her. In the course of her departure, CAUTERY 10 planned to use a Soviet military vehicle to take her luggage to the station, having been authorized such service by the Soviet "Special Service Officer" KIRILOV. As her bags were being loaded, she was approached by a Soviet officer and ordered to report to the nearby "NKVD" office for questioning, about her doings and right to use such a vehicle. She was able to talk herself out of this situation. X

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ABSTRACT INDEX

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after some time, and finally took the train at 0100 instead of at 1500 on the preceding day. At this late date, AMATOIII appeared on the train, and rode with her as far as KUB. She explained what had happened, and he told her to worry no further about the "KUB" since he would take care of that. He also asked her to let him know when they could meet again, in the course of another tour in the country, or else privately. AMATOIII got off the train in KUB, without having obtained any commitment from CAUTERY 10.

6. After this sequence of events, there was considerable discussion as to the probabilities of this situation (and also a change of case officer) and finally CAUTERY 10 wrote a second letter to AMATOIII, stating that she would probably not return for some time, giving an address through which she could be reached, and asking him to let her know when and where he would like to meet her. This letter was also translated into Russian by one of our agents, and was sent on or about 1 February. Until now, we have had no answer.

7. There are many obvious holes in the above described operation. However, it does not appear that any one of them (or even their total) can invalidate the whole. On various vital points, we have to rely on the unassisted word of CAUTERY 10, but all staff and agent personnel connected with her seem impressed with her veracity and anti-Soviet leanings. Assuming, pessimistically, that something has gone wrong and that this operation is penetrated at some point, we can see no reason to let it drop now, since we are not directly endangered until a Soviet body is produced. We intend to keep up the pressure with any means at our disposal, in the meantime employing CAUTERY 10 in whatever other ways appear to be most profitable potentially.

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